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"YOU GOT NO SECRETS TO CONCEAL":
CONSIDERING THE APPLICATION OF
THE TARASOFF DOCTRINE ABROAD
Prof. Michael L. Perlin*
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in the level of interest in
the United States about the law of other nations.' Much of this interest
has been spurred by the pitched battle in the U.S. Supreme Court
between Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia on the question of the extent
to which foreign law should inform US constitutional decisionmaking, a
battle that has played out in such volatile areas as the death penalty2 and
gay rights.3 But there has also been new interest (concededly, with
much less drama) in the relationship between international human rights
law and mental disability law.4 Much of the interest has been spurred by
a series of decisions by international courts and commissions that have
drawn liberally on such documents as the United Nations General
Assembly's 1991 "Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental
Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care" (the "MI
Principles").5 Most, though not all, of these cases have focused on
* Director, International Mental Disability Law Reform Project; Director, Online Mental
Disability Law Program, New York Law School. The author wishes to thank Jackie Halpern, Danny
Gershburg, and Carra Greenberg for their excellent research help, and to especially thank Sarah Green
for her insightful and helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 743 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (death penalty unconstitutional in cases of
persons with mental retardation); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty
unconstitutional in cases of juveniles).
3. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S 558 (2003) (Texas statute making it a crime for two
persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional).
4. See, e.g., Eric Rosenthal & Leonard S. Rubenstein, International Human Rights Advocacy
Under the "Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness, '" 16 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
257 (1993); Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Treatment of People with Mental Illness
in Eastern Europe: Construing International Human Rights Law, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
537, 556-59 (2002); Eric Rosenthal & Clarence J. Sundram, International Human Rights in Mental
Health Legislation, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 469, 527-31 (2002); Jennifer Fischer, A
Comparative Look at the Right to Refuse Treatment for Involuntarily Hospitalized Persons with a
Mental Illness, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 153, 183 (2006).
5. Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental
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issues of commitment, institutional conditions, and the right to refuse
treatment-the staples of U.S.-based constitutional mental disability
law.6
Little attention has been paid, however, to the relationship between
private U.S.-based mental disability law and international human rights
law. And the law that is the topic of this symposium-tort law as it
relates to the existence of a psychotherapist's duty to protect/duty to
warn, as articulated originally in the Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California case 7 -is certainly private law. Indeed, because
of our perception that "tort culture" is a uniquely U.S.-based
phenomenon,8 it should not be a surprise that, until now, there has never
been a discussion in any American law review of the Tarasoff principles
in the context of European law.
9
Health Care, G.A. Res. 46/119, U.N. Doe. A/46/49 (Dec. 17, 1991), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r119.htm; see, e.g., Matter of Victor Rosario Congo, Case
11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 63/99,OEA/Ser.L./V/II.102, doc. 36 (Apr. 13, 1999) (Ecuador).
It can be expected that there will be more such attention paid in the future as a result of the recent
adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. See UN Enable,
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2007) (UN Convention).
6. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND COMPARATIVE
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2006).
7. See generally, 3 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
§§ 7C-2 to 7C-2.10, at 446-99 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551
P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) and its progeny); Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous
Patient: New Directions for the 1990's, 16 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 35-36 (1992).
8. See, e.g., Mark Mildred, Litigation Rules and Culture: The European Perspective, 23 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 442 (1997) (in the context of product liability law):
[T]here remain many significant differences between the two systems, such as: different
procedural and substantive laws; different degrees of access to the courts; and different
socio-cultural attitudes toward litigation. These differences continue to influence the
direction of tort liability laws in Europe. It remains to be seen how well Europeans have
balanced the need for judicial constraints on procedures and awards against the need for
individuals to obtain justice and compensation.
Id.
9. A WESTLAW JLR search (TARASOFF /P EUROPE CONTINENT "UNITED
KINGDOM" ENGLAND) revealed no article in any US-based publication, and only two articles from
elsewhere that made this connection. Westlaw Homepage, https://www.westlaw.com (last visited June
21, 2006). See, e.g., James Dawson, Randomised Controlled Trials of Mental Health Legislation, 10
MED. L. REV. 308, 310 (2002) ("Even in England there is a chance that health professionals may be
found liable to a person harmed, where injuries are clearly foreseeable to specific individuals in the
immediate proximity of the patient.") (citing Palmer v. Tees Health Auth., [2000] P.I.Q.R. I (A.C.),
discussed infra notes 83-87); Gehan Gunasekara, Whistle-blowing: New Zealand and UK Solutions to a
Common Problem, 24 STATUTE L. REV. 39, 42 (2003) ("It has been accepted, in New Zealand as
elsewhere, that privacy is not an absolute right and that the public interest must always be balanced
against it and override it where necessary. This is especially so where public health or safety are
involved.") (citing Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 334).
2006] "YOU GOTNO SECRETS TO CONCEAL" 613
In recent years, I have turned my own attention more and more to the
relationship between mental disability law and international human
rights law, and have begun to write,10 teach," advise, 12 and speak 3 in
that field. But again, until now, all of that work has focused on
questions of public mental health law. As I have continued to work in
that area, however, I have started to wonder whether there might also be
a relationship between international human rights law and private mental
disability law. This speculation was informed, to a significant extent, by
the European Court of Human Rights' (ECtHR) 14  multiple
interpretations of Articles 2 and 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (the Convention). 15  Under those Articles, "[e]veryone's
right to life shall be protected by law,"'16 and, "[i]n the determination of
his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law."' 7 Although my interest in the ECtHR was
originally and primarily focused on its relationship to substantive and
procedural constitutional "mental disability law,"' 8 and its construction
10. Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights and Comparative Mental Disability Law: The
Role of Institutional Psychiatry in the Suppression of Political Dissent, 39 ISRAEL L. REV. 69 (2006);
Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights and Comparative Mental Disability Law: The Universal
Factors, SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. (forthcoming 2007) (Perlin, Universal Factors). PERLIN ET AL., supra
note 6.
11. I am now teaching a course, International Human Rights and Mental Disability Law. See
www.nyls.edu/mdl.
12. 1 am on the Board of Advisors of Mental Disability Rights International, a US-based NGO
(see www.mdri.org), and under the aegis of that organization have traveled frequently to Central and
Eastern Europe and to South America to do site visits to psychiatric institutions and to train advocates in
international human rights law principles. See New York Law School Profile: Michael Perlin,
http://www.nyls.edu/pages/389.asp (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
13. See Elizabeth Katz, Human Rights Abuses in Mental Institutions Common Worldwide, Perlin
Says, http://www.law.virginia.edu/home2002/html/news/2006-spr/perlin.htm (reporting on presentation
at University of Virginia Law School, co-sponsored by the American Constitution Society, the Human
Rights Program, and the Institute for Law, Psychiatry, and Public Policy, Feb. 22, 2006).
14. See generally, Clemens Rieder, Protecting Human Rights Within the European Union: Who
Is Better Qualified to Do the Job-The European Court of Justice or the European Court of Human
Rights? 20 TUL. EUR. & CIv. L.F. 73 (2005).
15. On the ECHR as a source of the right to equality, see Alexander H.E. Morawa, The Evolving
Human Right to Equality, I EUR. Y.B. MINORITY ISSUES 157 (2001).
16. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
pmbl., Europ. T.S. No. 5, art. 2, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC 13-
4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf [hereinafter Convention for Human Rights]; see
generally, Paul McKaskle, The European Court of Human Rights: What It Is, How It Works, and Its
Future, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (2005).
17. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 16, at art. 6. See also, Lawrence Gostin & Lance
Gable, The Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Global Perspective on the Application
of Human Rights Principles to Mental Health, 63 MD. L. REV. 20 (2004).
18. I define this as the law as it affects persons subject to institutionalization because of mental
disability (or perceived disability), persons so institutionalized, and the release of such persons to the
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by the ECtHR in a wide range of cases involving, inter alia, civil
commitment, the right to treatment, and the right to refuse treatment, 19 I
began to wonder if this connection-which I believe to be important and
robust-also applied to private law matters.
But it was not until the summer of 2005, when I attended the 19th
International Congress of Law and Mental Health, that I realized that
this was a "live" topic. Professor Colin Gavaghan spoke at that
Congress on The Development of the Tarasoff Principle and Its
Application in Europe,20 and his talk illuminated for me the insight that
there were significant connections between international human rights
law and "private law," and that those connections were definitely worthy
of future study.
Through this paper, I hope to build on Professor Gavaghan's initial
research and to answer these questions: (1) what is the status of Tarasoff
abroad, and (2) what are the implications of my answer? As I will
demonstrate below, I have found that, in fact, there is life in Tarasoff
abroad. At this point in time, certainly, there is not the extensive
collection of commentary and cases we find in the U.S., but clearly,
there are nascent developments that I fully expect to expand in coming
years. And I think-no matter how you feel about the actual Tarasoff
decision-this is a good thing.
My paper will proceed in this way: In Part I, I will discuss briefly the
standard American psychiatric "take" on Tarasoff2' and will ask
whether this "take" reflects primarily American values or whether it is
more universalist. In Part II, I will briefly look at how related
confidentiality issues are looked at outside the US. In Part III, I will
consider how the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act-an important
factor in UK "duty to protect/duty to warn" law-relates to international
human rights law in a "dualist" system.22 In Part IV, I will look at the
(still modest) caselaw that broadly applies Tarasoff in an international
context. In Part V, I will conclude and will offer some modest
predictions for future developments in this area of tort law.
My title comes from Bob Dylan's masterpiece, Like a Rolling Stone,
which, according to critic Greil Marcus, is "the greatest record ever
made, perhaps, or the greatest record that ever would be made., 23 I
community.
19. See generally, PERLIN ET AL., supra note 6.
20. See Prof. Colin Gavaghan, Presenter at ABSTRACTS OF THE XXIXTH INTERNATIONAL
CONGRESS ON LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH, presentation 54.3, at 162 (2005).
21. For a full consideration of the facts and holding of the Tarasoffcase, see generally 75 U. CIN.
L. REv. 429, 429-661 (2006).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 44-47.
23. Guardian Unlimited Homepage, http://www.guardian.co.uk/arts/fridayreview/
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turned to it for this paper because of the line, "you got no secrets to
conceal." Patients go to mental health professionals with secrets, many
of which they have concealed for years.24 Mental health professionals
have traditionally seen the promise and expectation of secrecy as one of
the essential lynch-pins of the therapist-patient relationship. But
Tarasoff suggests to the patient that, in some limited but highly
important situations, "you [the patient] [in fact, do] got no secrets to
conceal."
I. MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS' REACTION TO
THE TARASOFF OPINION
Tarasoff unleashed a "torrent" of commentary, 25 and the initial
professional reaction to the case was, to understate it, "severely
critical. 26 Some advocated for civil disobedience; others advocated for
a lawsuit to be brought by the University of California against the
California State Supreme Court in federal court.2 7 The criticism focused
mostly on the unwarranted judicial intrusion into the private sphere of
psychotherapeutic practice.28  The major arguments put forth in
academic circles included these:
" A mandatory disclosure of confidential information would ultimately
harm the public because it would discourage patients from revealing
violent tendencies to therapists and discourage them from entering
therapy altogether if they were aware of the disclosure procedures.29
* Therapists may become highly oversensitive to dangerous
information, overreact and take action too often.30
story/O, 12102,1482218,00.html#articlecontinue (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
Here is what Bruce Springsteen said about Like a Rolling Stone when he inducted Dylan in the Rock
& Roll Hall of Fame in 1989: "The first time I heard Bob Dylan, I was in the car with my mother
listening to WMCA, and on came that snare shot that sounded like somebody had kicked open the door
to your mind." Id. See GREIL MARCUS, LIKE A ROLLING STONE: BOB DYLAN AT THE CROSSROADS 95
(2005).
24. See Michael L. Perlin, "'71 Give You Shelter from the Storm": Privilege, Confidentiality, and
Confessions of Crime, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1699 (1996).
25. James E. George et al., The Therapist's Duty to Protect Third Parties: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 637, 637 (1983).
26. 3 PERLIN, supra note 7, § 7C-2.3, at 456-67. See also, Perlin, supra note 7, at 35-36.
27. Solomon Fulero, Tarasoff: 10 Years Later, 19 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 184 (1988).
See A. Kovacs, Implications of the Malpractice Crisis for the Training of Graduate Students, Presenter
at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association (Aug. 1976), discussed in Fulero,
supra, at 184-85.
28. 3 PERLIN, supra note 7, § 7C-2.3, at 457.
29. Fulero, supra note 27.
30. Id.
2006] 615
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol.75
" The decision was premised on the "false view" 31 that therapists would
be able to predict future dangerousness with accuracy through
professional standards.
32
" Prioritizing the public good over the individual needs of the patient
violated central ethics of the practice.3
3
• The Tarasoff duty compromised the confidentiality essential to
successful psychotherapy.34
An empirical survey revealed that, in the immediate aftermath of
Tarasoff, a majority of respondents reported "increased anxiety when the
subject of dangerousness arose during therapy." 35 Over half reported an
increased fear of legal liability because of the newly recognized duty to
warn; almost a fifth reported feeling tempted to avoid probing into some
sensitive areas of therapy, including matters of dangerousness, and over
one quarter indicated that Tarasoff had led them to change their methods
of keeping records, mostly with the goal of seeking to avoid future legal
liability. 36  However, later surveys concluded that the "data does not
support the view that Tarasoff represents psychiatric Armageddon," but
that what Tarasoff has done is to "crystallize and shape beliefs
concerning a therapist's obligation to protect those at risk from a
patient."
37
Over a decade ago, these were my conclusions:
Surveys suggest that therapists have overstated both the Tarasoff
prescription (as to ways of effectuating the duty) as well as its national
precedential applicability. Furthermore, they frequently misstate its
holding, construe it to require accurate predictions, and, others believe the
duty to be triggered by utterance of any threat. Also, it has been argued
that professionals have been misled by associational newsletters that have
distorted or misstated the holdings of Tarasoff's progeny, and that these
misunderstandings serve to further alienate law and psychotherapy. 3
8
The question remains: To what extent will the experience in other
nations replicate these American findings?
31. Daniel J. Givelber et al., The Tarasoff Controversy: A Summary of Findings from an
Empirical Study of Legal, Ethical, and Clinical Issues, in THE POTENTIALLY VIOLENT PATIENT AND THE
TARASOFF DECISION IN PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE 35, 37 (James Beck ed., 1985).
32. 3 PERLIN, supra note 7, § 7C-2.3, at 457.
33. Givelber et al., supra note 31, at 37.
34. Joseph Dubey, Confidentiality as a Requirement of the Therapist: Technical Necessities for
Absolute Privilege in Psychotherapy, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1093 (1974).
35. Toni Pryor Wise, Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to
Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165, 181 (1978).
36. Id. at 181-82.
37. Givelber et al., supra note 31, at 56.
38. Perlin, supra note 7, at 57 (citations omitted).
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II. DOES CONFIDENTIALITY MATTER?
Even without a specific Tarasoff obligation, the expectation of
confidentiality is regularly qualified in other circumstances (e.g., when a
patient puts her mental state at issue in litigation, or when there is
conflict between confidentiality and a police power statute). 39 Although
it is rarely noted in the relevant debates, unlike the attorney-client
privilege (that has its roots in the law of the Roman empire), the priest-
penitent privilege (that dates back to medieval Europe) or the spousal
privilege (that dates to the earliest days of English common law), the
psychotherapist-patient privilege dates only to the 1950s, and "has not
produced the expectations of confidentiality created by the long history
and deep cultural roots of the other privileges.
4°
And so is the expectation of confidentiality or of privilege qualified in
other nations. By way of example, in Hong Kong, the privilege is
qualified where the maker of the statement has a duty (whether legal,
social, or moral) to make the statement and the recipient has a
corresponding interest to receive it.4 In India, the privilege will only be
recognized if the benefit to society outweighs the costs of keeping the
information private.42 And in New Zealand, the privilege does not apply
on a blanket basis to all information disclosed to a psychotherapist. 43 In
short, we should not expect that the degree to which other jurisdictions
were receptive to Tarasoff arguments should hinge on concerns about
potentially breaching absolute confidentiality.
III. THE NATURE OF DUALIST SYSTEMS
There are basically two European jurisprudential models: nations with
monist systems and nations with dualist systems. Nations such as the
Netherlands, for example, are considered "monist" where their
constitutions expressly provide that certain treaties are directly applied
and that in such cases these treaties are deemed superior to all laws,
39. See 3 PERLIN, supra note 7, § 7A-5, at 333-34. For an overview of the literature on
confidentiality in general, see id. at 331-32 n. 351.
40. Daniel A. Cantu, When Should Federal Courts Require Psychotherapists to Testify About
Their Patients? An Interpretation of Jaffee v Redmond, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 375, 376 (citing, inter
alia, DANIEL W. SHUMAN & MYRON F. WEINER, THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE: A
CRITICAL EXAMINATION 49 (1987), and Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1454, 1530 (1985)).
41. Li Suk Han Hana v. Sun Tien Lun Catherine, [2005] H.K.C. 758.
42. Sharda v. Dharmpal, 2 LRI 173 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 2003).
43. Ross v. Fryer, [2003] NZFLR 666 (NZ Fam. Ct.).
2006] 617
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including local constitutional norms.4 4 On the other hand, the United
Kingdom is generally considered the "prime example" 45 of a dualist
system in which treaties must be implemented through separate
legislation in order to have the effect of domestic law.46 If domestic law
cannot be construed in accordance with Conventionlaw, then the latter
overrides domestic law.47
IV. TARASOFF ABROAD
The most important developments abroad have come in the United
Kingdom, a dualist system. There, the Human Rights Act (HRA)
mandates that domestic law must be read and given effect "in a way
which is compatible with the [European] Convention [of Human
Rights], 48 that it is "unlawful for a public authority to act in a way
which is incompatible with a Convention right, 49 and that domestic
courts must "take into account" the jurisprudence of the European
Human Rights Courts in deciding cases under the HRA. 50  Explicitly,
passage of the HRA was evidence of Parliament's determination "to
give further effect to ECHR rights in domestic law so that people can
enforce those rights in the United Kingdom courts., 51 The HRA is thus
seen as a mechanism, not solely for the "maintenance" of Convention
rights, but also for the "further realization of human rights and
fundamental freedoms., 52 Unquestionably, then, the ECHR applies to
cases involving residents of the United Kingdom. 53
44. John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 310, 320 (1992).
45. d. at 319.
46. Lord Templeman, Treaty-Making and the British Parliament, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 459,
481-83 (1991). See also PIETER VAN DIJK & GODEFRIDUS J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 67 (2d ed. 1990).
47. R. v. Sec'y of State for Transp., exparte Factortame Ltd. (No. 2), [1991] 1 AC 603 (H.L.).
48. Human Rights Act § 3 (1998) (U. K.).
49. Id. at § 6(1). See, e.g., Lord Gordon Slynn, The Development of Human Rights in the United
Kingdom, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 477 (2005); Carolyn Johnston & Jane Kaye, Does the UK Biobank
Have a Legal Obligation to Feedback Individual Findings to Participants? 12 MED. L. REV. 239 (2004).
50. Human Rights Act § 2(I) (1998) (U. K.).
51. Conor Gearty, Unraveling Osman, 64 MODERN L. REV. 159, 159 (2001) (quoting PARL.
DEB., H.L., Vol 593, col 1910 (Oct. 28, 1998) (statement by Baroness Symons)).
52. Roger Masterman, Taking the Strasbourg Jurisprudence Into Account: Developing a
Municipal Law of Human Rights" Under the Human Rights Act, 54 INT'L & COMPAR. L.Q. 907, 910
(2005) (citing ECHR, preamble).
53. See generally, KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE
MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE (2001); Roman Kwiecien, The Primacy of
European Union Law Over National Law Under the Constitutional Treaty, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1479 (2005),
available at http://www.germanlawjoumal.com/article.php?id=649 (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
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Beyond this, section 2(1) of the HRA allows for the consideration of
jurisprudence from other jurisdictions.54 So it should not be surprising
that European courts have cited Tarasoff (and other American duty to
protect cases) on several occasions. 55  Also, in parallel developments,
international and comparative law scholars have been urging the
creation of a legally integrated body of tort law among European
nations.56  The emergence of such law will "guarantee ... individual
plaintiffs to have full access to domestic courts in the Contracting
States. 57 Interestingly, in a paper urging support for such a body of
law, Professor Stathis Banakas focused specifically on its potential
application to cases in which "a psychiatrist assumes responsibility to a
patient that he leads into an emotional or sexual relationship. 58
The key variable in any consideration of the Tarasoff doctrine abroad
is the weight given to international human rights documents such as the
European Convention of Human Rights (the Convention), and especially
Article 2 that reads, in relevant part, "Everyone's right to life shall be
protected by law.",59 From this clause flows the caselaw that we need to
think about with regard to the question I have posed: is there a duty to
warn or protect in other nations?
Unquestionably, Article 2 is considered "one of the most fundamental
provisions in the Convention" 60 and "enshrines one of the basic values
of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe." 61 There
is no originalist argument to be made: the European Court of Human
Rights has consistently stated that the Convention is a "living instrument
which... must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions";
62
what is more, the convention itself assumes that "domestic courts will
also take a progressive approach to the rights and fundamental freedoms
54. Masterman, supra note 52, at 921.
55. See, e.g., Palmer v. Tees Health Authority, [2000] P.I.Q.R. 1, P12 (A.C.) (citing Tarasoffv.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976);Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P. 2d 728
(Cal. 1980); and Brady v. Hopper, 751 F. 2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984)).
56. Walter van Gerven, The Emergence of a Common European Law in the Area of Tort Law:
The EU Contribution, in TORT LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 125,
135-36 (Duncan Fairgrieve et al. eds., 2002).
57. Id. at 146.
58. Stathis Banakas, European Tort Law: Is It Possible? 10 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 363, 370 (2002).
See also, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, Is It Healthy to Have an EU Health Law? 30 EUR. L. REV. 697 (2005).
59. It must be emphasized that these rights are not guaranteed solely to minorities; they are
secured to "everyone." On this point, see Roberta Medda-Windischer, The Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, I EUR. Y.B. MINORITY ISSUES 487,487 (2001).
60. Osman v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245, 277 (1998).
61. Id.
62. Masterman, supra note 52, at 911 (citing Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, I
(1979-80)).
2006] 619
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it contains. 63 Beyond this, it is clear that the potential use of the HRA
as a "tool for the development of domestic common law standards is not
in doubt."
64
The first, and by far most important, case to consider is Osman v.
United Kingdom.65 There, Mrs. Osman sued a local police force for
failure to protect her husband (who was shot by Paget-Lewis, their son's
teacher who had formed an obsessive attachment to the son),66
notwithstanding ample communication between the Osman family, the
police, school officials and a school psychologist. 67 Mrs. Osman argued
that the police had been put on adequate notice of Paget-Lewis's danger
to their family, but that they had failed to adequately protect the family.
The Court of Appeals struck the action (on the grounds that the police
could not be found negligent for failure to investigate a crime).68
Subsequently, Mrs. Osman-as she is allowed to do in a dualist
system-petitioned the European Court of Human Rights on the
grounds, inter alia, that the appellate court's decision violated Article 6
of the Convention, providing that "[i]n the determination of [one's] civil
rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by
[a] ... tribunal. ' 69
In a fractured decision, the European Court of Human Rights rejected
the plaintiff's argument under Article 2, concluding that the plaintiff had
"failed to point to any decisive stage in the sequence of the events
leading up to the tragic shooting when it could be said that the police
knew or ought to have known that the lives of the Osman family were at
real and immediate risk from Paget-Lewis.,, 70 According to the court:
For the Court, and bearing in mind the difficulties involved in
policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the
operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and
resources, such an obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not
63. Id. at 911.
64. Id. at913.
65. Osman, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 245. The HRA did not incorporate the ECHR until 2001, three
years after the Osman case was decided. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is probably
worthwhile to consider the post-Osman furor-see infra text accompanying notes 76-82-in this
context.
66. Osman, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 252-56 (recounting incidents in which Paget-Lewis
photographed the Osmans' son, stalked him, left obscene graffiti about him on multiple occasions
around the school, stole files that contained the son's new address, and changed his name to Osman).
67. Id. at 257. The school psychologist noted that the teacher "must indeed give cause for
concern," and did have "personality problems," but recommended he remain as a teacher at the school.
Id.
68. Id. at 263-64.
69. Id. at 285.
70. Id. at 308.
620
"YOU GOT NO SECRETS TO CONCEAL"
impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.
Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a
Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk
from materialising. Another relevant consideration is the need to ensure
that the police exercise their powers to control and prevent crime in a
manner which fully respects the due process and other guarantees which
legitimately place restraints on the scope of their action to investigate
crime and bring offenders to justice, including the guarantees contained in
Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention.
In the opinion of the Court where there is an allegation that the
authorities have violated their positive obligation to protect the right to
life in the context of their above-mentioned duty to prevent and suppress
offences against the person, it must be established to its satisfaction that
the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence
of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or
individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to
take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably,
might have been expected to avoid that risk.
7 1
The court also rejected the plaintiffs application under Article 8
("Everyone has the right to respect for his private... life..."),
concluding that there was no breach of any "positive obligation" under
this Article.7 2 However, the Court ruled further that the plaintiffs rights
under Article 6 were violated:
[T]he Court considers that the applicants must be taken to have had a
right, derived from the law of negligence, to seek an adjudication on the
admissibility and merits of an arguable claim that they were in a
relationship of proximity to the police, [and] that the harm caused was
foreseeable... In the view of the Court the assertion of that right by the
applicants is in itself sufficient to ensure the applicability of Article 6(1)
of the Convention.
73
There were multiple concurrences and dissents. In one, three judges
argued that there was enough evidence that for several months,
authorities were "well aware of the strange and worrying behaviour of
Mr Paget-Lewis," and that "they could have had hardly any doubts that
further, more serious, harm was to be foreseen." 74 Interestingly, for the
purposes of this symposium, they suggested a remedy that would have
fit within the dictates of Tarasoff" "[The police] should have taken Mr.
Paget-Lewis into custody before it was too late in order to have him
71. Id. at 305.
72. Id. at 309-11.
73. Id. at 313.
74. Id. at 324-25 (DeMeyer, Lopes Rocha, and Casadevall, JJ.s, partially dissenting and partially
concurring).
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cared for properly. Instead they let things go until he killed two persons
and wounded two others. 75
Importantly, the holding of Osman focused on the issue of immunity-
from-suit, and not on the substantive law of negligence, and the court
ultimately concluded that the Osmans had the right, under the ECHR, to
proceed with their case. Nonetheless, the case became a barometer for
public attitudes about the substantive expansion of negligence-based
liability. It thus quickly inspired a cottage industry of commentary.76
One analysis characterized Osman as "extraordinary,, 77 seeing it as
having "alerted tort lawyers to the potential significance of the HRA,
[and as a potential] springboard for broader common law
development., 78  On the other hand, in a lecture to the Common-Law
Bar Association, Lord Hoffman candidly admitted Osman filled him
with "apprehension, 79 and served to "reinforce the doubts I have had
for a long time about the suitability, at least for this country, of having
questions of human rights determined by an international tribunal made
up of judges from many countries." 80  Indeed, one British review article
concluded that Osman "mystified many members of the senior judiciary
in this country," 8' noting that one judge of the House of Lords
characterized the Osman case as "extremely difficult to understand. 82
The year after Osman was decided, in Palmer v. Tees Health
Authority, the British Court of Appeals rejected a plaintiffs claim in a
case in which the plaintiff's daughter was abducted, sexually assaulted,
75. Id. at 325. See id. at 269-71 (setting out involuntary civil commitment criteria).
76. See Rosalind English, Forensic Immunity Post-Osman, 64 MOD. L. REV. 300, 305 (2001)
(discussing commentary).
77. Tom R. Hickman, Tort Law andHuman Rights, 13 KING'S C. L.J., 253, 253 (2002).
78. Id. at 261. On the other hand, the same author also speculated that it might otherwise be
viewed as a "narrow adjunct to the law of tort." Id.
79. Lord Hoffmann, Human Rights and the House of Lords, 62 MOD. L. REV. 159, 164 (1999).
80. Id.
81. Gearty, supra note 5 I, at 184.
82. Id (citing Barrett v. London Borough of Enfield, [1999] P.I.Q.R. P272, P276 (H.L.) (scope
of duty owed to child in foster placement)). In Barrett, the House of Lords stated that claims should be
struck only when there are clear grounds for doing so. Id. at P283. This decision represented a
fundamental shift in favor of an expanded duty-of-care in negligence-based cases. See e.g., Robin
Cooke, The RoadAhead for the Common Law, 53 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 273, 281 (2004).
Later, in Z v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, 126 (2002), a case involving actions by abused
children against local authorities who allegedly owed them a duty of care breached by their failure to
prevent the abuse (at the hands of the children's' parents), based on legal arguments characterized as
"novel and entirely speculative," the European Court of Human Rights narrowed the range of
circumstances in which decisions to strike claims could be seen as breaching Article 6. See generally,
Richard Mullender, Tort, Human Rights, and Common Law Culture, 23 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 301, 307
(2003). Nonetheless, Osman is still seen as the leading case in this area of the law.
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and murdered-and her body mutilated-by Armstrong.83 Plaintiff had
sued a hospital where Armstrong had been previously psychiatrically
treated, and alleged that defendants "'failed to diagnose that there was a
real, substantial and foreseeable risk of Armstrong committing serious
sexual offences against children and of causing serious bodily injury to
any child victims,' and consequently failed to provide him with adequate
treatment to reduce the risk of him committing such offences."84 The
Court of Appeal distinguished Osman because there was no relationship
between the perpetrator and the victim. Although Armstrong had said
during treatment that he had "sexual feelings towards children and that a
child would be murdered after his discharge,"8 5 there was no
relationship between Armstrong and the specific victim, so the requisite
proximity was absent.
86
Interestingly, Palmer distinguished Tarasoff "where the court [had]
held that there was a duty to warn an identified victim." 87 The court
elaborated:
An additional reason why in my judgment in this case it is at least
necessary for the victim to be identifiable.., to establish proximity, is
that it seems to me that the most effective way of providing protection
would be to give warning to the victim, his or her parents or social
services so that some protective measure can be made.... [T]he ability to
restrict and restrain a psychiatric patient is subject to considerable
restriction under the Mental Health Act 1985 . . .and are not unlimited in
time.... It may be a somewhat novel approach to the question of
proximity, but it seems to me to be a relevant consideration to ask what
the defendant have done to avoid the danger, if the suggested precautions,
i.e. committal under section 3 of the Mental Health Act or treatment are
likely to be of doubtful effectiveness, and the most effective precaution
cannot be taken because the defendant does not know who to warn. This
consideration suggests to me that the Court would be unwise to hold that
there is sufficient proximity.
88
Tarasoff has been cited in a bare smattering of other occasions in
British cases. In W. v .Edgell,89 for example, the plaintiff, who had pled
guilty to manslaughter in a multiple homicide case and was subsequently
83. [2000] P.I.Q.R. I (A.C.).
84. Id. at P1.
85. Id. at P3.
86. Id. at P11. Proximity, of course, is an element of tort claims in the United Kingdom. See
e.g., Caroline Johnston & Jane Kaye, Does UK Biobank Have a Legal Obligation to Feedback
Individual Findings to Participants? 12 MrD. L. REV. 239, 246 (2004).
87. Palmer, [2000] P.I.Q.R. at P12 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at P12-P13.
89. [1990] Ch. 359 (C.A.).
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institutionalized in a secure hospital, retained a psychiatrist to submit a
report supporting the plaintiff's petition for transfer to a regional facility.
When the psychiatrist indicated he could not support the transfer, the
plaintiff withdrew his application to the tribunal and refused to consent
to the defendant disclosing the report to the medical officer at the secure
hospital. The doctor disclosed the report, and the plaintiff subsequently
sued him for breach of confidentiality. The trial judge found that the
duty of confidence owed by the defendant to the plaintiff not to divulge
the contents of the report was overridden by the public interest in
protecting the public by placing the report before the proper authorities,
and he dismissed the actions.90
The plaintiffs appeal was dismissed, the appellate court, citing
Tarasoff holding that "[t]he balance of public interest clearly lay in the
restricted disclosure of vital information to the director of the hospital
and to the Secretary of State who had the onerous duty of safeguarding
public safety." 9 1  In language that tracks the "public peril begins"
language from Tarasoff, the court concluded on this point:
Although it may be said that Dr. Egdell's action in disclosing his
report... fell within the letter of paragraph 81(b) [of the Medical
Council's confidentiality rules], the judge in fact based his conclusion on
what he termed "broader considerations"-that is to say, the safety of the
public. I agree with him.
92
Then, in D v. East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust,93the
parents of young children brought actions for negligence against
healthcare authorities, claiming damages for alleged psychiatric harm
caused by unfounded allegations made by healthcare and child care
professionals that the parents had abused their children. The House of
Lords affirmed the dismissal of the parents' case, noting:
In some American jurisdictions it has been accepted that a doctor may
owe a duty to a person who is not his patient [citing, inter alia, Tarasoff
and Sullivan v. Moody,94 an Australian case].... In the present case
acceptance of that proposition is implicit in acceptance of a potential duty
to the child. So the question is whether, in diagnosing the child's
condition in a case of possible abuse, the position of the child is so
different from that of the parent that a duty may sensibly be owed to the
90. Id. at 364.
91. ld. at416.
92. Id.
93. [2005] 2 A.C. 373 (H.L.).
94. (2001) 207 CLR 562 (Austl.).
2006] "YOU GOT NO SECRETS TO CONCEAL" 625
one but not to the other.
95
Neither of these cases, however, has been the subject of commentary
that Osman has.96 And it is clear that Osman did lead to a "serious
reappraisal of public ... negligence claims;, 97 that it required courts to
"attach more weight to the interests of claimants;" 98 that "there are fewer
policy arguments against liability available to public bodies than there
were before Osman;"99 and that courts are "now more favourably
disposed to claimants in such cases." ' 00 After Osman, English courts
will be more reluctant "to dispose of negligence" claims prior to a
hearing on the merits0 as a result of Osman's "pushing back the
boundaries of public authority liability."
' 10 2
Of course, Osman was not, strictly speaking, a "Tarasoff case." But
there is no question in my mind that it helped create a judicial
environment that will be more sympathetic to such claims. One
commentator has observed:
What Article 2 may now do... is to require judges now to take the
decision whether the care and treatment provided was adequate or
proper ... rather than to decide.., solely whether it was treatment which
103a responsible body of doctors would have provided...
Notwithstanding the rejection of the plaintiffs' claim in the Z case,' 04
95. East Berkshire Cmty Health NHS Trust, [2005] 2 A.C. at 397.
96. In addition to the articles discussed supra text accompanying notes 76-82, and infra notes
98-102; see also E.J. Ryan, Failing the System? Enforcing the Right to Education in New Zealand, 35
VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 735 (2004); Tony Weir, All or Nothing?, 78 TUL. L. REV. 511 (2003-
2004); Franqois du Bois & Daniel Visser, The Influence of Foreign Law in South Africa, 13
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 593 (2003); J.K. Mason & G.T. Laurie, Misfeasance in Public
Office: An Emerging Medical Law Tort?, 11 MED. L. REV. 194 (2003); J.A. Weir, Human Rights and
Damages, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 413 (2001).
97. Andrew Lidbetter & James George, Negligent Public Authorities and Convention Rights-
The Legacy ofOsman, 2001 EUR.HUM.RTS. L. REV. 599, 605.
98, Id. at 606.
99. Id. at 615.
100. Id. at 599.
101. A.C.L. Davies, The European Convention and Negligence Actions: Osman "Reviewed", 117
L.Q. REV. 521, 524 (2001).
102. van Gerven, supra note 56, at 146. One commentator grumpily criticized Osman as paving
the way for subsequent cases that he characterized as potential "compensation-seeker's charter[s]."
Alastair Mullis, Barrett v. Enfield London Borough Council: A Compensation-Seeker's Charter? 12
CHILD& FAM. L. Q. 185 (2000).
For an interpretation of Osman in a prison suicide case, see Keenan v. United Kingdom, 33 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 913 (2001) (immaterial whether risk came from third party or from individual's propensity for
doing harm to himself).
103. Philip Havers, The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Medical Law,
70 MEDICO LEGAL J. 57, 68 (2001).
104. See supra text accompanying note 82.
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Osman's language as to risk, identifiably, and foreseeability remains
viable.' 0
5
Also important to note are recent tort decisions from the continent on
duty of care and other issues that may also give rise to Tarasoff-like
obligations. 10 6 By way of examples, an Austrian court has found (in a
contractor's accident case) that an individual may owe a duty of care to
specified third parties;' 0 7 a Swiss court has found (in a ski accident
case), that a party had no duty to provide safety measures against
"unpredictable behavior; ' 08 a Greek case (involving an attack in a
business's parking lot) mandated a duty to protect the company's
clientele;109 and a Finnish case (involving the need to warn as to the
hazards of smoking tobacco) found a potential duty of care.110 In the
one case more factually connected to the issues under consideration here
(albeit tangentially), another Swiss court, in denying recovery in a
suicide case, framed the question as to whether the doctor acted
according to general standards of medical expertise." These and other
cases led an editor of a yearbook edited by the European Centre of Tort
and Insurance Law to conclude that "there is a growing tendency to
accept duties of the public authorities to become active for the protection
of the citizens." 112
IV. CONCLUSION
Why is this important? I think this all is important for several
interlocking reasons. First, the American notion of Europeans (or,
better, non-Americans) being tort litigation-phobic may need some
reassessment. Second, even though Tarasoff has been cited only a
handful of times in non-domestic contexts," 3 the idea of a duty to warn
or to protect does have legitimacy outside our borders. Third, the issue
that was the immediate flashpoint of the Tarasoff case and its immediate
105. Cf JANE WRIGHT, TORT LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 145 (2001) (after Z, focus in Osman-type
cases likely to shift to other Convention Articles).
106. On the differences in legal cultures in common law and civil law nations, see Pierre Legrand,
Are Civilians Educable? 18 LEGAL STUD. 216 (1998).
107. EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2001, at 68 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger eds., 2002)
[hereinafter ETL] (citing [2001] JBL 525).
108. Id. at 466 (citing [2000] Pra. 89, no. 185 (Switz.)).
109. Id. at 272 (citing [2001] ChrlD A', 310, 311).
110. Id. at 184 (citing [2002] LM 100).
Ill. Id. at 468 (citing [2000] Pra. 89, no. 155 (Switz.)).
112. Helmut Koziol, Comparative Remarks, in ETL, supra note 107, at 522.
113. See Palmer v. Tees Health Auth., [2000] P.I.Q.R I (A.C.); W. v. Egdell, [1990] Ch. 359
(A.C.); D. v. East Berkshire Cmty Health, [2005] 2 A.C. 373 (H.L.).
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progeny-the concern that lack of absolute confidentiality might do
irreparable harm to the patient-psychotherapist relationship-does not
appear to even be a consideration outside of the U.S.14
Fourth, contrarily, the underlying issues of public agency liability-
especially as articulated in Osman-are the central issues abroad. Fifth
(and, perhaps most significantly), the European court system appears to
have no problem whatsoever in intertwining what we see as "private
law" issues (even if, as in Tarasoff-though not in many of its
progeny" 15-the party defendant is a public entity) with what we see as
public law issues (which we often treat as "civil rights cases")" 16 . The
reliance on the ECHR as the lynchpin for the Osman decision tells us
that the potential deprivation of a forum in a Tarasoff-case is seen as a
violation of international human rights. This conclusion may have
profound implications for future developments in this area.
Sixth, as discussed earlier, there is a current raging controversy as to
the extent to which international law should have an impact on domestic
law. 117 If European courts continue to maintain a keen interest in this
area, fallout from the current battle may ultimately have an impact on
the extent to which U.S. courts are willing to consider the European
cases in future Tarasoff-type litigation. Finally, other domestic courts
across the continent appear to be comfortable with the notion of a duty
to warn or protect in many other areas of tort law," 8 and there appears to
be nothing to suggest that these courts would be adverse to the creation
of a Tarasoff-type duty.
As stated earlier, in the past several years, there has been a significant
increase in the intersection between international human rights law and
mental disability law. 19 Most of this new attention has focused on the
wretched institutional care to which persons with mental disabilities are
subjected around the globe. 120  But some has also begun to focus on
114. This issue, of course, was not present in Osman. Cf Queen R (on the Application of Ann S.)
v. Plymouth City Council, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 388 (C.A.) (action by mother of adult son seeking the
disclosure of confidential information from local social service authority).
115. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Law Div. 1979), discussed extensively in 3
PERLIN, supra note 7, § 7C-2.4a, at 462-64.
116. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
117. See, e.g., Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 1.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 107-112.
119. See PERLIN ET AL., supra note 6; UN Convention, supra note 5.
120. See, e.g., Rosenthal & Sundram, supra note 4; Winick, supra note 4; Angelika C. Moncada,
Comment: Involuntary Commitment and the Use of Seclusion and Restraint in Uruguay: A
Comparison with the United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness, 25 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 589, 591 n.6 (1994); Oliver Lewis, Mental Disability Law in Central and
Eastern Europe: Paper, Practice, Promise, 8 J. MENTAL HEALTH L. 293(2002).
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community issues. 12 1 It is not particularly provocative to predict that
there is a good chance that this will lead to a greater focus on this entire
related area of law and on the legal regulation of psychiatric practice
(which remains at the heart of the Tarasoff decision).122
Some 14 years ago, I wrote this about the Tarasoff case in a domestic
context:
The impact of heuristic thinking123 on Tarasoffdecisionmaking (and on
clinician response to Tarasof), r the complex therapeutic jurisprudential
implications of the decision, the paucity of empirical data bases upon
which litigators, lawmakers, and judges can draw: these are areas crying
out for new research, new ideas, and new reforms. It is to these questions
that our attention must now turn. 
125
I expect these same prescriptions apply to the international arena as well.
I conclude by returning to my title. The chorus that follows the line
quoted in my title (the final chorus) reads:
121. See, e.g., Arlene S, Kanter, The Globalization of Disability Rights Law, 30 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 241 (2003); PERLIN ET AL., supra note 6, eh. 11; Perlin, Universal Factors, supra note
10; see generally UN Convention, supra note 5, at art. 19:
States Parties to this Convention recognise the equal right of all persons with disabilities
to live in the community, with choices equal to others, and shall take effective and
appropriate measures to facilitate full enjoyment by persons with disabilities of this right
and their full inclusion and participation in the community, including by ensuring that:
(a) Persons with disabilities have the opportunity to choose their place of residence and
where and with whom they live on an equal basis with others and are not obliged to live
in a particular living arrangement;
(b) Persons with disabilities have access to a range of in-home, residential and other
community support services, including personal assistance necessary to support living
and inclusion in the community, and to prevent isolation or segregation from the
community;
(c) Community services and facilities for the general population are available on an equal
basis to persons with disabilities and are responsive to their needs.
Id.
122. Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 625, 645 n.86 (1993) (compare Lawson R. Wulsin et al., Unexpected Clinical Features
of the Tarasoff Decision: The Therapeutic Alliance and the "Duty to Warn", 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
601, 601 (1983) ("[T]he clinician.., is understandably disturbed by the concept of therapeutic
approaches being disruptively influenced from remote judicial benches."), with Richard J. Bonnie,
Professional Liability and the Quality of Mental Health Care, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 229, 236
(1988) (Tarasofflitigation "has made a beneficial contribution to [patients'] quality of care.")).
123. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling
Role of "Mitigating" Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 239, 241-
42(1994).
124. See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw": The Impact of the ADA on the
Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 228 (2000).
125. Perlin, supra note 7, at 63.
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How does it feel
How does it feel
To be on your own
With no direction home
Like a complete unknown
Like a rolling stone?
126
It is not a stretch to think about the victims' families in such cases-
the Tarasoffs, the Osmans-to feel as if they are on their own. With no
direction home. (To the legal system), complete unknowns. Perhaps the
infusion of life into the Tarasoff doctrine in other nations will make
them feel somewhat less like a rolling stone.
126. BOB DYLAN, Like a Rolling Stone, on HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED (1965) (lyrics at
http://bobdylan.com/songs/rolling.htm).
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